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Abstract
One of the problems that must be dealt with in ei-
ther a formal or implemented temporal reasoning
system is the ambiguity arising from uncertain
information. Lack of precise information about
when events happen leads to uncertainty regard-
ing the effects of those events. Incomplete infor-
mation and nonmonotonic inference lead to situa-
tions where there is more than one set of possible
inferences, even when there is no temporal un-
certainty at all. In an implemented system, this
ambiguity is a computational problem as well as
a semantic one.
In this paper, we discuss some of the sources of
this ambiguity, which we will treat as explicit dis-
fl_r_ction, in the sense that ambiguous information
can be interpreted as defining a set of possible
inferences. We describe the application of three
techniques for managing disjunction in an imple-
mentation of Dean's Time Map Manager. Briefly,
the disjunction is either: removed by limiting the
expressive power of the system, explicitly repre-
sented, one disjunct at a time, or approximated
by a weaker form of representation that subsumes
the disjunction. We use a combination of these
methods to implement an expressive and efficient
temporal reasoning engine that performs sound
inference in accordance with a well-defined for-
mal semantics.
1 Introduction
One of the problems that must be dealt with in either a
formal or implemented temporal reasoning system is the
disjunction arising from uncertain information. Lack of
precise information about when events happen leads to
uncertainty regarding the effects of those events, and thus
to uncertainty in what propositions are true at some point
in time. Incomplete information regarding what proposi-
tions are true when, and nonmonotonic inference (e.g., the
persistence assumption or qualified causal projection) lead
to situations where there is more than one set of possible
inferences, even when there is no temporal uncertainty at
all [6]. In a formal system, this ambiguity is noted and in
_Tkis work is supported by DARPA and the Air Force
Rome Laboratory under Rome Laboratory contract P30602-
90-C-0102.
some way dealt with, either by changing the semantics to
exclude it (e.g. by assigning a preference relation to the
possible models of a given theory), or simply by acknowl-
edging it (i.e. couching conclusions in terms of the set of --
possible models).
In an implemented system, this ambiguity is a computa- :
tional problem as well as a semantic one. In this paper, JJ
we discuss some of the sources of this ambiguity, which
we will treat as explicit disjunction, in the sense that am-
biguous information can be interpreted as defining a set
of possible inferences. We describe how these sources of
disjunction are dealt with in our current implementation
of Dean's Time Map Manager [5; 2]. Briefly, we take one
of three approaches:
1. The disjunction is removed by limiting the expressive
power of the system.
2. The disjunction is explicitly treated, but the system
considers only a single disjunct at a time. ""
3. The disjunction is approximated by a weaker form of
representation that subsumes the disjunction.
The semantics that we are attempting to capture in our
implementation are defined in [1], which provides a precise
formal semantics for the current version of the TMM.
In the rest of this paper, we briefly discuss the ontology -v
and semantics of the TMM, provide some specific examples
of the kinds of disjunction that arise, and discuss the costs
and benefits of various ways of handling these types of
disjunction.
2 The TMM :_
Dean's Time Map Manager [5; 2] is an implemented tem-
poral reasoning system, intended as a foundation for build-
ing planning and scheduling systems. The TMMincludes ca- =
pabilities for reasoning about partlally-ordered events, per-
sistence and clipping, and two simple forms of causal rea-
soning: projection and temporal implication (sometimes
called Uoverlap chaining I in previous work). The version _.j
of the system described in [5; 2] that was distributed from
Brown (hereinafter referred to as _'_,-TMM") implements
forward persistence only, and does not implement tempo- _--
ral implication. "_
Besides these limitations, the inference performed by _,-
TMM is not sound for partially-ordered time points [3], and
so has no weU-defined semantics. For partial orders, the in- ..,
ference done by the system is interpreted as quantification
over total orders consistent with a given partial order: a
formula of the form holds(t, P) is interpreted to mean that _ _
the proposition P holds at the time point t in all possible _'-_
total orders. The sense in which the original system is un-
sound is that it will sometimes infer holds(t, P) when there
were total orders in which P does not hold at t. As Dean
and Boddy show in the same paper, reasoning about what
is true in the total orders consistent with a given partial
order is an NP-complete problem.
We have addressed these difficulties by implementing a
sound but incomplete decision procedure that approxi-
mates quantification over time points (i.e., if the system =6,
infers holds(t, P), the proposition P does in fact hold at the -_
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time point t in every total order, but sometimes this prop-
erty will be true and the system will not infer holds(t, P)
[4]. We have made other extensions, inc]udlng generalising
persistence to run backward as well as forward (in order to
handle cases like Kauts's "parking lot problem." [7]), and
implementing tempor_i implication: reasoning in which the
truth of some set of facts at a point can he used to conclude
that some other fact is true at the same point. We have
retained from the old system the concepts of peea_tence
clipping and causal projection (referred to hereinafter as
simply "projectionS). 1 The new T_M implementation we
The TMM implements an epistemic semantics, in the sense
that a proposition may be known (or believed) to hold at
a point, or known not to hold at that point, or we may not
know either way. This semantics is described more care-
fnlly in [1]. The failure of the excluded middle in this se-
mantics is useful for representing problems where we have
only partial information. All of the propositions in the
domain theory are believed necessarily. Temporal proposi-
tions are believed necessarily at all points throughout their
observation intervals. Inference from projection and tern-
pored implication result in the addition of new tokens to
will refer to as U_LTMM." t_le time map, representing belief in propostions holding
As far as we know,/_-TMM is the first implementation of for new intervals of time. Persistence is captured in a pref-
sound-and-incomplete temporal reasoning as described in erence over models: those in which the appropriate facts
[4]. The proce8 of implementing this decision procedure persist are preferred over those in which they don't. Con-
has made clear precisely how the resulting system is in-
complete; this point will be addressed in Section ??
2.1 Ontology and Inference
In this section we present a simplified version of the TMM--- *
representations that is sumcient for this discussion. A do- s
main theov'y in the language includes a time map and a •
cagsal theol. The time map consists of a set of time points
T and a set of formulas. Time map formulas include the •
foUowing_ The
Temporal relationsbetween time points, denoted by
the binary infix predicates <, _<, --, _>, and >, and
the predicate distance(tl, t2, bounds), where tL 1:2 E
T and bouncb = [rl r2] where rl, r2 E _ are the
bounds of a Closed interval'
relations in the time map as constraints.
Temporal formulas, holds(t1, 1:2, P), where tl, t2 E
T and P E 7>, the set of propositions. The period
flicts in these preferences result in ambiguous situations,
where no single set of inferences can be preferred to all
others.
The theory including the time map and causal rules is in-
tended to support the foUowing kinds of inference.
holds(tl, t2, l_):P iStrue:ih all possible worlds.
holdsm(tl, 1:2, P): P is true in some possible world.
Inferences about necessary and possible temporal re-
lations.
Boolean combinations of these.
first two kinds of inference concern belief in quantifies.
tious of temporal formulas over po_ible worlds consistent
with the user-supplied domain theory. The simplest form
of ambiguity in the domain theory that can lead to multi-
ple possible worlds results from a set of temporal relations
We represent temporal that defines only a partial order on the set of time points.
between tl and 1:2 is called the %bservation interval"
(throughout which the proposition must necessarily
hold.) We use the abbreviation holds(1:, P) when this
interval is a point. We represent temporal formulas
on the time map using time token,.
• PersiJtence assumptions, persistsf(1:i, P)
and persistsb(1:2, P), where tl, 1:2, and P appear in
some temporal formula as above. We associate persis-
tence assumptions with time tokens on the time map.
The causal theory for a "rMM theory includes causal *'ales,
intended to encode the physics of a domain in a simple
way, of the following kinds.
• Projection rules, project((and (Px,..., Pi,)), E, It).
The propositions Pl,..., Pt are antecedents;, E is a
"trigger" proposition; It a forw//rd-persistent "iesult"
proposition. When the antecedent propositions are
believed to hold throughout the trigger, the result is
believed starting at a specified time after the trigger.
6 Temporal implication rules, (and (Pl,..., Pt)) =_t R.
At any point for which the propositions of the an-
tecedent conjunction are all believed to hold, the re-
sult proposition It is believed to hold.
XDetsils of extensions planned and accomplished can be ob-
tained by request from Bob Schrag, at the addreu at the be-
ginning of this paper.
2.2 Sources of Disjunction
There are several sources of disjunction in the TMM. There
is one source of disjunction we have explicitly removed:
there is no way to assert an explicit disjunction in the
domain theory. You can say that proposition P is true
at time t, and that point tl is ordered before point 1:2.
You cannot, for example, say that 1:1 and 1:2 cannot occur
simultaneously (i.e., they are definitely ordered one way
or the other).
This leaves us with two main classes of disjunction to deal
with. The first is the temporal uncertainty resulting from
the fact that we do not require time points to be totally
ordered. Actually, there is additional metric uncertainty:
we can specify the distance between two time points only
as a range without that meaning that there is any uncer-
tainty in ordering anywhere in the time map. Metric tem-
poral uncertainty is straightforward to deal with. It affects
no inference more complicated than directly determining
whether a proposition holds at a point. Partially ordered
points are a more complex problem because ordering af-
fects which inference rules fire. For either projection or
temporal implication, whether the rules fire is based solely
_ on ordering relationships: all the possible assignments to
temporal relations consistent with a given total order are
equivalent, as far as which causal rules will _fire." For this
source of disjunction, the "possible worlds _ are the total
orders consistent with the given partial order. Deciding
=21
whethera propositionholdsat s point necessarily, possi-
bly, or not at all becomes a question of quantifying over
the set of total orders. In Section 3, we discuss how this is
accomplished (approximated, actually) in the TMM.
The other source of disjunction we must consider is a di-
rect result of the semantics we impose on the system: the
persistence assumption. Nonmonotonic reasoning has been
recognised by many people at many times as a source of
ambiguity and unintended conclusions (most relevant to
our work is Hanks and McDermott's paper on applying
nonmonotonic logic to temporal reasoning [6]). Unfortu-
nately, it appears to be too useful to dispense with. Simply
stated, the persistence assumption says that things tend
not to change unless something changes them. If I walk
into a room, see that the light is on, and walk out again,
it seems both reasonable and useful to conclude that the
light was on before I got there, and again after I left. 2
Contradictory information (e.g., walking into the room at
a later point and noticing that the light is off) will cause
the system to draw different conclusions. The persistence
assumption can lead to ambiguous conclusions in a wide
variety of situations, a representative sampling of Which
are discussed in Section 4.
In the examples in the following sections, we represent
time maps as follows: A time point is represented by a
dot: •. An observation interval is represented by two
time points connected by a line: @-----@. Temporal or-
dering is from left to right, and all points are drawn
with respect to a given frame of reference. When a time
point is connected to a solid line, we know its relation
with respect to the reference exactly. A dashed llne as
ino--------e indicates uncertainty about the point's loca-
tion. Forward and backward persistence are represented
by forward- and backward-pointing arrows: -q_-, ---_-. We
label tokens with the corresponding propositions and we
label time points when we need to refer to them: •. A lone
timepoint with a proposition label is a sero-lengt_Iobserv_ -
tion intervaL• P. A single time point with a persistence
symbol is a persistent version of the same thing: _ P.
To illustrate, here is a simple time map situation demon-
strating the firing of a projection rule. Relevant textual project(P, E, It)
information is displayed above the time map. project(-_P, E, R)
pr0ject(P, E, R) P _ •
tl • t_ E
• -- P _ It
=. -- E •
O...e- It tS
3 Partial Orders
The problem with partially-ordered time maps is that in-
ference such as projection and temporal implication de-
pend on what facts hold at a given point. This re|ation
is defined only for totally ordered points, and so we are
reduced to determining what facts might possibly or nec-
essarily hold at a point, in some or all of the total orders
_How "reasonable" persistence is, is context-dependent.
Consider the same example where I see a cat sleeping on a
chair, or a newspaper on a seat on a train.
consistent with the given partial order. With even a very
simple causal model, this is an NP-complete problem [4].
The solution we have implemented (first presented in [3])
is to approximate the necessary quantification.
_-TMM includes two holds definitions which together pro-
vide a sound-and-incomplete temporal reasoning algorithm
which executes in polynomial time. Each definition ap-
proximates a quantification over the possible worlds con-
sistent with the domain theory, holdss (mlrong holds) is
a sound-and-incomplete approximation to holds. We use
holdss to identify a auSaet of all necessarily believed tern-
poral propositions, holdsw (_eak holds) is a complete-and-
unsound approximation to holdsm. We use holdsw to iden-
tify a r_peraet of all possibly believed temporal formulas.
In the presence of inference such as projection, the strong
version requires the weak version: a proposition necessarily
holds over an interval unless there is a possibly-derived to-
ken (the result of a projection rule, or added by the user),
which possibly contradicts (clips) that proposition for some
part of that interval
holdss is incomplete in two ways:
• It avoids comblnatorics by looking for a single token
to span the query interval for _/l possible worlds. It
will fail in a case where the interval is spanned by
different tokens in different total orders.
• It relies, ultimately, on the over-achieving ho[dsw to
defeat the strong tokens' perslstences.
ho[dsw is _t_ound in two ways:
• It avoids combinatorics by checking for a conjunction
of possibilities rather than a possible conjunction. It
succeeds sometimes when the conjuncts are not mu-
tually satisfiable.
• It relies, ulthnate]y, on the under-achievlng holdss to
defeat the weak tokens' persistences.
Some of these points are illustrated in the following exam-
plea.
Example I" Incompleteness in holdss can arise directly
from opposing contradictory persistences.
-_p
Our semantics says that the persistences for P and -_P clip
at some point between ¢I and _21, but not where. One of
P or -,P covers E in all total orders, so holdr_i:3, It). We are
limited to holdsw(t3, It).
Example 2z Unsoundness in holdsw can arlae directly
from partially ordered timepoints.
distance(t1, t2, 3Idistance_t3, t4,
O----,--------,----41 p
tl _ _ t_ E
p does
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not cover E in any po_ible world, so -_holdsm(t3, t4, P)_
but the conjunction of possible temporal relations in
h0ldsw(t3, _4. P) k _tidled, and it succeeds, unsoundly.
Even though we do not have (tl _ t3 Am t2 _ t4), we do
have (tl <:m t3 A t2 __m t4).
Example 3: Incompleteness in hoidss can arise indirectly,
througl_ weakly and unsoundly derived defeaters.
distsnce('tl, t2, 3)
dis_sncelt3, t4, 5)
p,oject(P,s,
• - _ _ P
tl _ __t2 E
t4e-.- s
"_R
ts
From Example 2 above, we know the token for It is weakly
and unsoundly derived, and we should have holds(iT, -_R).
But -_R is defeated weakly and unsoundly and we are lira-
Red to holdsw('C7, -_R).
While strong inference (holdss) is incomplete in a well-
defined and limited sense (checking a single token), the
approximate nature of weak inference (ho[dsw) is less pre-
cise. There are tradeoffs that can be made. For example,
it is possible to add or omit s check on the maximum pos-
sible extent of a given token, rather than just the ordering
of the endpoints. Adding such a check would result in s
sy_.em that handled Example 2 correctly. At an additional
co_n.'putational expense, of course.
4 Ambiguous Models Resulting
From Persistence
The persistence assumption combines with temporal impli-
cation or projection to generate situations in which there
ar_several possible models for s given domain theory. In
ot_er words, we can construct theories in which P is true at
so_e time T in some models (possible worlds) and false in
others. These situations arise even if we limit ourselves to
th_..0ries where all temporal relations are precisely specified
for every point in the time map. In the following scenario,
there are two temporal implication rules and four tokens
specified in the domain theory (the dashed line on the right
hand side separates a picture of the initial conditions from
three different "possible worlds" corresponding to different
models that can be constructed).
Example 4" Temporal implication with persistence can
be ambiguous.
RI: (and P Q) =¢'t -_lq
R2: (and g I) =_t -'P
p @.-4-
e-------e Q
M
pmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm_mq
P
Q
"_lq
!!
(world 1) |
ip mmmm m mw mm mmmmmmmw wmm.m mmwmmmmwwm m.m mwmmmmmwmm mmmlll
P
Q
M
(world 2) -- |
ip mmmm mmmmw mmmmmmlmmmmmmmm mmmmm mwm mmmmm mmm mw m mw mm m q
P
Q
M
(world 3) !i
In the first possible world (below the first dashed line) we
maximise the extent of P's persistence. The result of the
temporal implication rule R1, forces us to clip the persis-
tence of }¢just after the end of Q. This world will be pre-
ferred to any world that is the same as this world except
that P stops being true at some point after the end Q due
to the persistence assumption: we prefer for P to persist
as long as possible. Multiple models, and thus ambiguity
or disjunction, result when there are several models none
of which is preferred over any of the others. -_ There is a
symmetric case, in which M's persistence is maximized. In
the second model, the persistence assumptions for P and
!_ are maximised with respect to each other. Neither of
the rules come into play in this interpretation. They are
maximal with respect to each other in the sense that if
you extended either, the others' extent would be reduced.
Finally, consider a case where P (or symmetricaly M) is al-
lowed to persist to some point within the extent of Q (N).
The third picture shows one of an infinite number of pos-
sible worlds that can be obtained in this way. In each of
_ these worlds, the persistence of P and Q are maximised
with respect to each other in the same sence as described
above.
It is not diitlcult to come up with similar scenarios in-
volving projection and backward persistence; or temporal
implication and forward persistence. In fact fairly complex
scenariol can be created using chains of projection rules,
temporal implication rules, and persistence. There is an
easily-identifiable condition of the causal theory that is
necessary but not sufficient condition for theories to entail
these kinds of ambiguities. Basically, we look for certain
hinds of cycles using static analysis of the rules. Consider
a DAG created from the rules as follows:
• Create a node in the DAG for each unique antecedent
_,_ ..... and consequent proposition
• For each rule create an arc from each antecedent node
SFor s more careful discussion of the use of model preference
to model persistence see e.g., [8; I]
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to the consequent node
• For each consequent node create an arc to each con-
tradictory antecedent
If any cycles exist in this DAG then our theory may entail
the kind of non-monotonic disjunction describe above.
We have identified two approaches to implementing a prac-
ticai system that deals with this kind of disjunction:
• Don't deal with it at all. Use the static rule analysis
technique described above to reject rule sets that may
entail this kind of disjunction.
• Use an approximation that is sound and incomplete,
The idea is to be extremely conservative when looking
for possible ambiguities. Any time there is a rule that
may participate in a cycle of the sort described above,
' prohibit any backward persistence from being used as
_J' an antecedent.
Both approaches are rather heavy-handed: the analyze-
and-complain approach ]eaves the user either without func-
tionality or without predictability; both approaches over-
react to prevent situations that may not occur, on the
grounds that specific situation detection is too expensive.
This will be a further source of incompleteness in the infer-
ence the system does. The complaining approach can be
turned into a warning approach that goes on to do weak
clipping.
5 Summary
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In this paper, we have identified the sources of disjunction
that must be considered in a temporal reasoning system
that handles partially-ordered time points, forward and
b_ckward persistence, and two simple forms of cauea] rea-
soning. These sources can be grouped roughly into two
classes, one corresponding to problems arising from tern-
porai uncertainty (partial orders), the other the result of
the nonmonotonic persistence assumption. There is actu-
ally a third source of disjunction that we have finessed by
restricting the expressive power of the system: we do not
permit the expression of explicit disjunctive propositions.
We have demonstrated three general classes of methods
for dealing with disjunction, and proposed specific fixes for
specific problems. Where possible, we have described im-
plemented solutions from our work on the TMM. This pa-
per presents the first clear characterization of the sources of
incompleteness in the sound-and-incomplete decision pro-
cedure described in [4],
The techniques we have developed for managing disjunc-
tion are crucial to our implementation of an efficient tem-
poral reasoning system. In particular, the representation
of_a set of disjunctions by some simpler description of a
l_er set including those disjunctions is a powerful tech-
nique that has found repeated use for handling disjunctions
with s wide variety of sources and characteristics. With
a little care, the resulting system retains the property of
soundness, which we regard as crucial to the implementa-
tion of a useful system for temporal reasoning.
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